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NOTES.
RAILROAD

COMPANY'S LIABILITY FOR GOODS LEFT IN THE
CHECK Room.
The American courts, it seems, have not yet had presented to
them the question of the nature of a carrier's liability for the
failure to safely keep articles left in its check room. This
question has, however, repeatedly come before the English
courts, where the main issue seems to have been whethergranting that the carrier had a duty of safe keeping-could the
liability for a failure to perform this duty be limited by conditions printed upon the check handed out as a receipt for the
goods?
A recent Scotch case, Lyons v. Caledonian Ry. Co., 19o9

Sessions Cases 1185, serves to illustrate the conclusions arrived
at by the English courts." It was there held that the goods

'Harris v. Great Western R. R., 45 L. J. C. P. N. S. 729; Van Toll
(293)
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were deposited subject to the conditions printed on the ticket
given to the depositor upon the receipt of the goods, and that
since the conditions, in this case, were not fulfilled by the person so depositing, the railroad company was not liable for the
loss. This decision was reached in spite of the fact that the
condition provided that there should be no liability whatever
unless a certain requirement was met, and although the loss
resulted from apparent negligence on the part of the defendant,
the carrier, for the goods were stolen from the company's platform where they had been left, instead of being deposited in the
cloak room. The decision is, however, supported by the direct
authority of a leading English case,2 which reached the same
result on almost identical facts.
In coming to their conclusion the English courts go upon the
theory that the carrier and the depositor enter into a contract
by which the carrier's liability is limited, and, as a result, a very
important question is raised as to what degree of knowledge
the depositor must have of the conditions printed on the ticket
to be bound thereby. In the leading case 1 the condition was
printed on the back of the ticket with a notice calling attention
to it, on the face. The depositor read the notice, but did not
read the condition and yet was held bound thereby. Said the
Court: "The plaintiff knew the goods were received on condition and he must, therefore, be held to have accepted the conditions and it is of no consequence that he did not read them.
By accepting the ticket without objection and thereupon depositing the goods he represented to the company that he agreed
to the conditions and so induced them to enter into the contract. He is thus precluded from disputing the conditions upon
which the railway company relied."
So, also, even where the plaintiff, in the trial, was not asked
whether or not she had seen the notice on the back of the
ticket, whereby the company's liability was limited, the company was not held liable for the loss of such deposited goods. 4
The Court here proceeded on the ground that the company had
received the deposit, not as carriers to forward, but as ordinary
bailees upon the terms contained in the printed notices, which
terms being within the plaintiff's means of ascertaining them,
the plaintiff must be taken to be bound thereby. Willes, J., said:
v. South EasternR. R., 12 C. B. N. S. 7.5; Parker v. South Eastern R.
R., 46 L. J. C. P. N. S. 768; Prattv. South Eastern R. R., 66 L. J. Q.
B. N. S. 418.
'Harris v. Great Western R. R., 45 L. J. C. P. N. S. 729.
'Lyons v. Caledonian R-y Co., i9og Sessions Cases 1185.
' Van Toll v. R. R., 12 C. B. N. S. 75.
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"Assuming that the plaintiff did not read the terms of the condition, it is evident that she knew they were there and that she
was satisfied to leave the goods in the hands of the company
upon those terms. The obvious result is that either she must
be taken to have assented to the terms, or if she did not assent
she knew they were -terms which the railway company intended
to stipulate for." In a later case 1 Mellish, J., said: "If in the
course of making a contract a party delivers a paper to another
containing writing and the party receiving the paper knows
that the paper contains conditions which the party delivering it
intends to constitute the contract, I have no doubt that the
party receiving the paper does, by receiving and keeping it, assent to the conditions contained in the paper, although he does
not read them and does not know what they are. On the other
hand, if the person receiving the ticket does not know there is
any writing at all upon the back of the ticket, he is not bound
by a condition printed on the back." If the third alternative be
true that the plaintiff knew there was writing on the ticket, but
did not know that the writing contained conditions, nevertheless,
he would be bound, in the opinion of Mellish, "if the delivering
the ticket to him in such a manner that he could see there was
writing upon it, was, in the opinion of the jury, reasonable
notice that the writing contained conditions."
In view of these English decisions, it may be interesting to
note the attitude of American courts upon the question of
knowledge of conditions which are printed upon baggage tickets, and which limit the carrier's liability. As a preliniinary
proposition it should be noted that in the case of a shipper of
merchandise making a delivery to a railroad company there is
a presumption upon receipt of the bill of lading or other receipt, in the absence of proof of any unfair means having been
resorted to by the carrier to keep him from understanding its
terms, that the shipper assented to the lawful limitations included in the bill of lading or receipt." By acceptance of the
receipt the plaintiff estops himself from saying that a contract
has not been made between himself and the carrier according
to the terms of the receipt, 7 and if he fails to read it he does so
at his peril."
The ordinary baggage check, however, is of a different nature,
5

Parker v. R. R., 46 L. J. C. P. N. S. 768.
"Hutchinson on Carriers, §409.
T
Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166; Kirkland v. Dinsmore, 62 N.
Y. 71.
8
Belger v. Dinsmore, q1 N. Y. 166; McMillan v. Ry. Co., 16 Mich.
112.
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being a mere token given by the carrier as evidence that he
has received the carrier's baggage, and does not, in itself, import a contract. Hence, no presumption will arise from any
limitations which are written upon a baggage check, that they
were known to the passenger and assented to by him, when
the check was delivered to- him." To constitute limitations of
the carrier's liability the conditions must be shown to have been
called to the passenger's attention, or, at least, the circumstances
must be shown to have been such that the passenger knew of
the conditions when he accepted the check. 10 Thus it was held,
that, where a carrier delivered to a passenger a baggage check
which had a notice on the back thereof limiting its liability,
and which on its face had the words "look on back," there was
no presumption of law that the passenger had read the notice. 1
Where the conditions on a card given as a receipt for baggage were printed in small letters, while the other matter appeared in large and attractive print, it was held "at least equivocal in its character" and the plaintiff was not presumed to
know its contents or to assent to them. 2 As was said by the
New York Court :18 "Where a traveler, on delivery of baggage
to a local express company receives a paper which from the
circumstances of the transaction, he has a right to regard simply
as a receipt or voucher to enable him to follow and identify
his property, and no notice is given to him that it embodies the
terms of a special contract or is intended to subserve any other
purpose than as a voucher, his omission to read the paper is
not per se negligence and he is not as a matter of law bound
by its terms." Whether, in a particular case, the party receiving such a receipt accepted it with notice of its contents, or
with notice that it contained the terms of a special contract, so
as to require him to acquaint himself with the contents, is a
S. D.C.
question for the jury."

'Hutchinson on Carriers, §1298; 6 Cyclopedia Law and Procedure,
p. 664.
10
R. R. Co. v. Cox, 29 Ind. 36o; Malone v. R. R. Co., 12 Gray 388;
Blossom v. Dodd, 63 Hun. 324; Maden v. Sherrard,73 N. Y. 329; Woodruff v. Sherrard,9 Hun. 322.
Malone v. R. R., 12 Gray 388.
'Blossom v. Dodd, 43 N. Y. 264.
"Gossman v. Dodd, 63 Hun. 324.
" Maden v. Sherrard, 73 N. Y. 329.
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DEFINITENESS OF CHARITABLE BEQUESTS.

It is well settled that where a testator gives his trustees discretion to apply a bequest to charitable or other purposes as in
their judgment may seem proper, it cannot be sustained as a
charitable bequest. Sometimes the testator uses expressions
in connection with charitable bequests that give rise to considerable conflict of judicial opinion as to whether the bequest was
intended to be purely charitable, the additional words being
mere redundancy of expression, or whether the testator intended the trustees to use discretion in applying the funds to
charitable or to other purposes.
Thus, in the recent Scotch case of Mackinnon v. Mackinnon1
the testator directed that the residue of his estate should be
paid "to such charitable or philanthropic institutions, one or
more, in Glasgow or the West of Scotland, as my trustees may
select as in their opinion may seem most deserving." It was
held, reversing the lower court, that this was to be construed
as a bequest in favor of charitable institutions, and not void
from uncertainty.
The controversy centered about the meaning of the word
"philanthropic." The question was whether "philathropic" was
meant by the testator as an alternative to "charitable," in which
case the trust would fail because too indefinite, or whether the
word was merely intended as equivalent or explanatory of the
word "charitable." Certainly, "philanthropic" is not the equivalent of "charitable," for there are many philanthropic objects
that could hardly be called "charitable ;" as, for example, recreation grounds, and grounds devoted to sport which are not for
the poorer classes, but are generally for rich and poor alike; or
a gift to landowners affected by industrial depression whose
incomes are reduced to a certain amount a year. 2 Other
objects could easily be named that would clearly be philathropic,
and to which the trustees would therefore be empowered to
apply the fund, but which would not be charitable. The Court,
however, held that "philanthropic" was used, not as an alternative but as explanatory of charitable, and expressly refused to
follow the celebrated English case of In re MacDuff, where,
under similar circumstances, "philanthropic" was held to be
alternative to "charitable," and the bequest void from uncertainty. Thus we may fairly say that the Scottish law, in contradistinctions to English law, is so far favorable to charitable
bequests that the Court will give effect to the testator's philan1 gog Session Cases, io41.
2In re MacDuff,

(I8)

2 L R. Ch.

451.
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thropic intentions to the extent of holding that the use of the

term "charitable or philathropic" is a mere pleonasm. The
Court in effect holds that the charitable purpose was so dominant in the testator's mind, that he did not intend to attach to
the word "philathropic" its ordinary, or at least a separate
meaning.

This is in line with other recent Scottish decisions. As in
3
Patterson's Trustees v. Patterson,
where the testatrix directed
her trustees to divide the residue of her estate "among such
charities or benevolent or beneficent institutions" as they in
their sole discretion should think proper, and this was construed
as a bequest in favor of charitable institutions and sufficiently
definite. The Court says: "I do not think that the testatrix
had in her mind three distinct and separate kinds of objects
which she intended to benefit: first, charitable objects; second,
benevolent objects; and third, beneficent objects; but that she
had in her mind only one kind of objects, viz., charitable objects, and that the others are merely used as exegetical of the
earlier words"-i. e., she described that class by three epithets,
viz., charitable, benevolent, and beneficent.
And so in Hays Trustees v. Bailee,' where the testatrix directed her trustees to apportion and pay over the proceeds of the
residue of her estate "amongst such societies or institutions of
a benevolent or charitable nature in such proportions as they
shall in their own discretion think proper," the Court sustained
the bequest as charitable in the following language:
"Applying the true canon of construction applicable to bequests of this description, I come without difficulty to the conclusion that the testatrix meant to use 'charitable' and 'benevolent' as equivalent terms." And further,
"The question comes to be whether the objects of the bounty
of this particular testatrix are sufficiently defined to enable a
trustee of ordinary common sense and ordinary familiarity with
the business of life to satisfy himself that he is selecting among
the class pointed out to him by the the testator."
It is safe to say, therefore, that the principle of benignant
interpretation of charitable bequests is applied more liberally in
Scotland than in England; and in this country the tendency
appears to be in favor of a more liberal construction of bequests of this nature.
There are several English cases that have given rise to considerable criticism, notably Ommanny v. Butcher5 where a trust
a 19o9 S. C. 485.
4io8 S. C. 1224.
I Turn and Russ 260.
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for a "private charity" was held void; and Williams v. Kershaw,6 which determined that a trust for "benevolent, charitable
and religious purposes" was not a good charitable use. The
chief objection to the former case would seem to be that since
the trustees could be required to account for a proper disposition of the funds, and could be dealt with for bad faith or for
any breach of trust, the bequest contains all the requisites of a
good charitable use; while in the latter case the context would
seem to sufficiently indicate that a caritable use was intended,
according to the most approved rules of interpretation applied
to charitable bequests.
These cases are criticised at length by Mr. Boyle in his work
on Charities, pp. 286-299, and his conclusion is that they are not7
sound expositions of the law. And in Saltonstall v. Sanders,
Mr. Justice- Gray also severely criticised them and arrives at
the conclusion that they are at least of doubtful authority in
England, and certainly not law in Massachussetts; holding that
the word "benevolence," had, under the Constitution and laws
of the State, acquired a meaning equivalent to, and synonymous
with, "charity." So also in Maine and New Hampshire the
word "benevolent" may include purposes that may be deemed
"charitable" by a Court of Equity."
But in New Jersey the strict English rule was applied in holding that a gift in trust to be distributed "to benevolent, religious
and charitable institutions" at the discretion of the wife of the
testator was not a good charitable use, and that the word
"benevolent" did not mean "charitable" by the context of the
will (Norrisv. Thompson, 19 N. J. Eq. 3o8).
G.H.B.

HAS A CORPORATION THE ImPLIED RIGHT TO PURCHASE ITS
OWN STOCK?
As framed above, the question has received diametrically opposed replies.' It is settled in England 2 and in several juris-

dictions in this country that a corporation has no such implied
'i N. Y. and Cr. 293.
Sii Allen 462.

"Goodale v. Mooney, 6o N. H. 535; Murdock v. Bridges, 91 Me. 124.
Thomp. Corp., §4075.
Betterby v. Rowland Co., 2 Ch. 14 (19o2); Ashhurst v. Mason, L.
R. 20, Eq. 225 (1875).
'Crandall v. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 73 (1884) ; Olmstead v. Vance Co., 196
IIl. 236 (19o2); Currier v. Lebanon, Co., 56 N. H. 262 (1875); State v.
Oberlin Ass'., 35 Ohio 258 (1878).
14
2
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power. On the other hand, the great weight of American
authority is in favor of such power 4 and a like view has been
re-affirmed in Wisconsin in two very recent cases.".
The solution of the question, however, is so interwoven with
economic problems, that it is difficult to extract from the cases
a purely legal theory, and we shall therefore consider separately four distinct sets of economic conditions as affecting the
corporation's power to purchase its own stock.
I. Where All the Stockholders Assent to the Purchase of Fully
Paid Stock.
In such case it is clear that no stockholder can complain of
the purchase, since he is estopped by his own vote in favor of
it. If the capital of the company has been reduced, it has
been with his own sanction. Nor would there seem to be a
valid objection by creditors. The liability of the shareholders
is limited to the amount of their subscriptions, and since these
have been fully paid up, the creditors have lost nothing by the
transfer, except possibly the reduction of the capital stock. The
corporation, however, is solvent, and there can, therefore, be
no objection to such use of their capital. Furthermore, it is
possible that the purchase be made out of earnings and not capital, in which case there could be no objection whatever. This
point has been so decided.6 The only remaining objection to
such purchase; then, is that it is beyond the charter power of a
corporation. This argument is most strongly presented by a
leading text writer on the subject,7 but is based entirely on the
assumption that the purchase is made with part of the company's capital, which, as we have indicated, is not necessarily
a valid premise. But even admitting that the capital is used in
making the purchase, it is submitted that this is within the common law power of a corporation to enter into contracts, etc., in
connection with its business. It is not an unwarranted reduction of the capital stock, since by the purchase the stock does
not become merged;8 or even if considered so merged, may
be afterwards reissued.9 On the whole, therefore, it is sub'See 4 Thomp. Corp., §4075, n. i and cases therein cited.
'Gilchrist v. Highfield, 123 N. W. 102 (19o9); Atlanta v. Smith, 123
N. W. io6 (i9o9).
'Lowe v. Pioneer Co., 70 Fed. 646 (1895).
'Morawetz Private Corp., Vol. I, §112, 2nd Ed.
' Western Imp. Co. v. Bank, lO3 Iowa 445 (1897).
'Comm. v. Boston Co., 142 Mass. 146 (1886); Central R. Co. v. P.
R. R., 31 N. J. Eq. 475 (i879).
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mitted that under such circumstances a corporation may make
a valid purchase of its own stock without doing violence either
to its charter, its stockholders, or its creditors.
II. Where All theStockholders Do Not Assent to the Purchase
of Fully Paid Stock.
The argument that any such purchase is a violation of the
corporation's charter, applies equally under all conditions and
it is therefore unnecessary again to deal with it here. The
chief considerations, then, are the possible results of the purchase upon stockholders and creditors. The latter can have no
more complaint here than under the former hypothesis; the corporation is solvent, and a purchase of the stock, while possibly
reducing the total amount of the fund they trusted, has left
sufficient for the payment of debts.
And under this second hypothesis it is equally clear that the
stockholders are not injured. Their stock is full paid, and they
are not therefore subjected to a greater individual liability
under any circumstances; while instead of necessarily being injured by such use of the capital, the sounder view is that expressed by Chief Justice Woodward of Pennsylvania in Coleman v. Columbia Oil Co. :10 "When a company buys in shares of
its outstanding stock," he says, "it enriches the shares of every
holder; for, whether the purchased shares be sunk, or sold at
a profit, or distributed pro rata among the stockholders, the
chance for an increase of dividend, or of shares, enhances the
value of each existing share." It is therefore submitted that
even though some stockholders oppose such purchase, yet it is
within the power of the corporation and cannot equitably be
complained of either by creditors or stockholders.
IlI. Where All the Stockholders -Assent to the Purchase of
Stock Not Fully Paid.
The stockholders are again estopped to allege an injury, having voted for the purchase. The creditors are in exactly the
same position as in the previous hypotheses. They have lost
the liability on the part of certain individuals for unpaid calls,
to be sure, but the corporation is solvent, and no distinction can
be made in theory between the taking of part of the capital to
purchase shares, as in the previous hypothesis, and the excusing liability for part of the captal, in return for shares, as in
the present case. Moreover, in Pennsylvania, even the liability
of the individual for unpaid calls would not be forfeited, under
1

Pa. 74, 77 (1865).
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the rule that a transferor of shares does not become discharged
from liability," and that the transferee assumes no liability to
the company for subsequent calls.' 2
IV. Where All the Stockholders Do Not Assent to the Purchase
of Stock Not Fully Paid.
Under these circumstances, while the creditors would be in
the same position as in the preceding hypothesis, the stockholders who dissented would have a very different right in the
matter. Instead of being liable for a call proportioned on the
total number of shares of stock issued, they are now, in case
of debt, liable for a proportion based on the total number of
shares less the number bought in by the corporation. In other
words, the stockholders are now liable for a greater proportionate share because of the decreased number of contributors.
To throw such increased liability on them against their will is
certainly inequitable, unless it can be said that by their contracts in purchasing the stock, the stockholders agreed to be
liable to any call up to the par value, and as they cannot be
liable above that in any event, they cannot be injured by an increased proportionate contribution. It is submitted, furthermore, that this last proposition is perfectly sound, and a complete answer to stockholders who complain of increased liability. Economically, then, the purchase is justified whether
the shareholders assent or dissent, and whether the stock be
fully or only partially paid up.
It is evident that in each of the four cases the legal proposition that the corporation has the implied power to make the
purchase, is essential. And this, of course, is the bone of contention in conflicting jurisdictions. If one accepts the view
that a corporation has such implied power, then, under the
above analysis, the legal right remains the same whatever the
surrounding conditions; while if the purchase is ultra vires
under one set of conditions, it is the same under any other.
All authorities agree that such purchase cannot be made
where it will actually injure creditors. 18 " On the other hand, all
agree that a corporation may receive its own shares by gift, bequest or in payment of a debt.'
' Messersmith v. Sharon Bank, 96 Pa. 44o (i88o).
'Franks Oil Co. v. McCleary, 63 Pa. 317 (1869).
" Crandallv. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 73 (1884) ; Clapp v. Peterson, io4 Il1.
26 (1882); In re Columbian Bank's Est. 147 Pa. 422 (1892).
"Navigation Co. v. Dazusons, 3 Gratt 19 (1846) ; Lathrop v. Kneeland, 46 Barb. 432 (1866).
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Therefore there can be no inherent objection to the act of a
corporation in holding its own shares, and the dispute is reduced
again to the question whether or not the use of the corporation
capital in purchasingits own stock is a power which it impliedly
possesses. And this, as we have shown above, is a matter of
hopeless conflict as far as authorities go, though it is submitted
that such power can be sustained on theory, and is of immense
practical convenience, if so adopted.
W.L.M.
LANDOWNERS' RIGHTS IN PERCOLATING WATER.
In Meeker v. City of East Orange,' the Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey refused to follow what is undoubtedly
the law of England, and probably the law of a majority of the
American jurisdictions, as to percolating water. The general
rule is that the owner of the soil may intercept and divert the
percolating waters, without liability to the owners of land in the
neghborhood through whose lands the water so diverted or intercepted would have flowed or percolated. 2 This is true, notwithstanding the fact that the consequences of his act in so diverting or intercepting the percolating water would be to injure
or even render entirely worthless another's well, spring or
surface watercourse.3
The present law of England on this subject is settled by two
leading cases, the first of which is Acton v. Blundell,4 in which
the court held that the question of percolating water "falls
within the principle which gives to the owner of the soil all that
lies beneath the surface; the land immediately below is his
property, whether it is solid rock, or porous ground or venous
earth, or part soil, part water; the person who owns the soil
may dig through and apply all that is found there to his own
purposes at his free will and pleasure. If in the exercise of
such right, he intercepts or drains off the water collected from
underground springs in his neighbor's well, this inconvenience
to his neighbor falls within the description of damumo absque
injuria."
The second of the leading English cases is Chasemore v.
'74 At. 379.

'Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324 (1843); Chasemore v. Richards,
7 H. L. Cas. 349 (i86o) ; Edwardsv. Haeger, i8o Il1. 99; Brown v. Kistler, i9o Pa. 499.
'Edwards v. Haeger,supra; Chasemore v. Richards, supra.
' 12 M. &. W. See also Angell on Watercourses, sec. IO9-114a.
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Richards.5 In that case, the plaintiff was the occupier of an
ancient mill on the River Wandle. He and his predecessors had
for more than sixty years used and enjoyed as of right the flow
of the river. The river was supplied above the plaintiff's mill,
by the rainfall on a district many thousand acres in extent,
comprising the town of Croydon and its vicinity. This water
percolated through the earth and found its way to the stream.
The defendants had pumped water by means of wells on their
own lands, to be used for supplying the town of Croydon with
water. The House of Lords decided that the plaintiff could not
recover, in spite of the serious damage to his mill.
These two cases have been generally followed, in the majority of American jurisdictions." The trend of modern authority, however, seems to be to apply to percolating water the same
principles which apply in the case of surface streams and subterranean water flowing in a defined chattel, i. e., that each
landowner may make a reasonable use of the water for the
purposes of his plot of land, paying due regard to the rights
of the other landowners. Thus, in Gould v. Eatong the English rule was followed, while in later cases in the same state
the doctrine of reasonable correlative rights has been applied.8
In a comparatively recent case in New York, Forbell v. New
York,0 it was held that the draining of land of a private proprietor by a city pumping station which exhausts from all the
region thereabout the natural supply of subsurface water and
thus prevents the raising on it of crops to which it was peculiarly adapted, or destroys such crops after they are grown or
partly grown, renders the city liable to the owner for damages
which he sustains and entitles him to an injunction against the
wrong. The decision in this case is based on reasonable use.
Earlier cases in New York followed the rule of Acton v. Blundell.10
The New Jersey Court, in referring to the case of Acton v.
Blundell and the reasoning on which it is based, argues: "The
impracticability of applying the rule of absolute ownership to
the fluid water, which by reason of its nature is incapable of
being subjected to such ownership, is apparently overlooked.
H. L. Cas. 349.
A. & E. Encyc. of Law (2nd Ed.) 312-313 and cases there cited.
iii
Calif. 639.
'See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Calif. 116.
' 164 N. Y. 522.
57

63o

"Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 230; Van Wycklen v. Brooklyn,
1x8 N. Y. 424.
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If the owner of Whiteacre is the absolute owner of all the percolating water found beneath the soil, the owner of neighboring Blackacre must

. .have the like proprietorship in his

.

own percolating water. How then can it be consistent with
declared principles to allow the owner of Whiteacre to withdraw by pumping or otherwise, not only all the percolating
water that is normally subjacent to his own soil, but also, at
the same time the whole or a part of that which is normally
subjacent to Blackacre?

.

.

.

Again, the denial of the ap-

plicability to underground waters of the general principles of
law that obtain with respect to waters on the surface of the
earth, is based, in part upon the mere difficulty of proving the
facts respecting waters that are concealed from view; but experience has demonstrated in a multitude of cases that this
difficulty is often readily solved, and when it is solved in a
given case by the production of the necessary proof, this reason
for the rule at once vanishes. It is sometimes said that unless
the English rule be adopted, landowners will be hampered in
the development of their property because of the uncertainty
that would be thrown about their rights. It seems to us that
this reasoning is wholly faulty. If the English rule is to obtain, a man may discover upon his own land springs of great
value for medicinal purposes or for use in special forms of
manufacture, and may invest large sums upon their development; yet he is subject at any time to have the normal supply
of such springs wholly cut off by a neighboring landowner."
The Court further remarks that their decision "does not prevent the proper user by any landowner of the percolating
waters subjacent to his soil in agriculture, manufacturing, irrigation or otherwise; nor does it prevent any reasonable development of his land by mining or the like, although the underground water of neighboring proprietors may be interfered
with or diverted. But it does prevent the withdrawal of underground waters for distribution or sale for uses not connected with any beneficial ownership or enjoyment of the land
whence they are taken, if it thereby results that the owner of
the adjacent

.

.

.

land is interfered with in his right to

the reasonable user of subsurface water upon his land or if
his wells, springs or streams are thereby materially diminished
in flow or his land is rendered so arid as to be less valuable for
agriculture, pasturage or other legitimate use."
The reasoning in the above case is so sound, and the cases
in England and America are reviewed in the opinion so thoroughly that extended comment would be superfluous. Questions as to percolating waters most frequently arise where

3o6
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there is a basin filled with saturated earth. In nearly all other
instances where a number of persons have a qualified right to
the same natural product, the doctrine of reasonable user is
applied. It is applied in the case of flowing streams, on the
surface or beneath the surface. Why should it not be applied
to percolating waters? The decision is based on correct legal
principles, is desirable from an economic viewpoint, and without doubt represents
the trend of modem authority in the
11
American states.

R.A.L.

NEGLIGENCE AS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY.

Where a statute imposes a legal duty, the violation of which
results in injury to a third person, in determining whether such
violation is the proximate cause of the injury we must take the
object of the .statute into consideration; and if the very contingency happened which the statute was designed to prevent,
the tort-feasor ought not to be relieved of the consequences of
his act unless he can show that the injury was in no way
probable nor reasonably to be anticipated.
In a recent case, The Santa Rita,' the facts, briefly stated,
were as follows: A steamer, The Santa Rita, was lying beside
a wharf, discharging a cargo of iron pipe. A large quantity of
fuel oil had escaped into the hold of the steamer, which was
pumped into the waters of the bay, in violation of a penal
statute. The oil floated on the water under the wharf and
around the libellant's ship, the Boieldieu, lying near The Santa
Rita. From some unknown cause, either from the spark of an
engine on the wharf, or from live coals taken from the engine
and thrown into the bay, or from fire on the wharf itself communicated to the oil on the water, the oil caught fire, and damaged the Boieldieu. It was held, that the act of the Santa Rita
in discharging the oil into the bay was not the proximate cause
of the injury, nor a concurrent cause, but only created a condition, which made the subsequent fire, which was deemed the
proximate cause, more disastrous, and that she was not liable
for the injury.
It is difficult to reconcile some of the authorities relied upon
by the court to support its conclusions. Certainly, the mere
'See also Washburn on Easements, 363-39o; 48 Cent. Dig. sec. Iio et
seq. For later cases see Farnham on Waters: Ch. 30; Note in 64 L. R.
A. 236.
1 173 Fed. Rep. 413 (Dec. i6, 19o9).

NOTES

violation of a penal statute does not make the offender liable
for the ensuing damage unless such act was also the proximate
cause of the injury; but where the statute was clearly enacted
to prevent conflagrations of this sort, by prohibiting the discharge of oil into the bay, it must have contemplated the probability of the oil becoming ignited and causing damage; hence,
the contingency that actually happened was not unforeseeable
by a reasonably prudent man, and the offender ought not to be
permitted to claim immunity, on account of the alleged remoteness of his negligence with respect to the injury. In such cases
the object of the statute should be considered. Nickey v. Steuder,2 is cited by the court as an authority in support of its conclusions. The defendants had employed the plaintiff, a boy
under the legal age of fourteen, in violation of a statute, in
their sawmill. A third party, a stranger, was engaged in loading wood from the mill on his wagon, and negligently threw a
stick of wood against the boy and injured him, and this was
the injury complained of. The Court says: "If the intervening
act is such as might reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated as the natural or probable result of the original negligence, the original negligence will, notwithstanding such intervening act, be regarded as the proximate cause of the injury,"holding, however, that the defendant's violation of the statute
in employing a boy under the legal age was not the proximate
cause of the injury.
The two cases are not parallel. The object of the statute in
the latter case was to protect minors from injuries likely to
result from working in a sawmill, and not from the wanton
or negligent acts of strangers; such acts could not reasonably
be anticipated from employing minors in sawmills. As in Gorris v. Scott,3 where a ship owner undertook to carry sheep, some

of which were washed overboard by reason of the ship owner's
neglect to take a precaution enjoined by statute to prevent the
spread of contagious diseases among animals; the ship owner
was not liable, because the object of the statute was to prevent
the spread of disease among animals, and not to protect against
the perils of the sea. And so, in Stone v. Boston & Albany R.
R. Co.,4 where the railroad stored oil on a freight house platform for a longer period than a statute permitted, and fire was
negligently caused by a stranger, which ignited the oil and
spread to the adjacent buildings; the railroad was held not lia2

8

164 Ind. i8g.
L. R., 9 Exch. (1874) x25.
Mass. 536.
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ble. If the statute had not been violated probably the fire would
not have been attended with such disastrous consequences; but
the act of a stranger in starting the fire was not such a consequence of the defendant's original wrong in allowing the oil
to remain upon the platform that the defendant is responsible
to the plaintiff for it. It is a close case, and there was a strong
dissent by Knowlton, J., on the ground that the statute was
passed to prevent such conflagrations, and the results might reasonably have been anticipated.
A recent North Carolina case, Bollinger v. Rader,5 presents
an interesting point on the question of proximate cause. A patient had been negligently discharged from the State Hospital
for the Insane by the Board of Directors, and six months later
committed a homicide. The Board of Directors were held not
liable. It is difficult to see how this case can be distinguished
from those where the keeper or owner of a wild and vicious
animal negligently permits it to run at large to the injury of
a third person. There can be no doubt as to the tort-feasor's
liability. This case would seem even stronger; for a wild and
dangerous animal at large may be taken and confined, or even
killed as a menace to the community by any one whose safety
is jeopardized, because the vicious propensities of the animal
are known; but one cannot resort to such summary measures
against a person discharged as sane from a hospital by the
proper authorities, because he is presumed to be harmless until
he actually shows dangerous propensities, and it may then be
too late. The cases relied upon 6 are not in point and are easily'
distinguishable on their facts.
One of the most recent cases on the subject, Dominion Natural Gas Co. v. Collins7 seems directly contra in principle to
The Santa Rita, considering the latter purely as a question of
negligence and proximate cause, apart from the violation of the
statute. This was an action for damages against the Gas Company in respect of an accident that occurred under the following circumstances: The Gas Company had installed a gas apparatus and was supplying natural gas in the machine shops
under an agreement with the Railroad Company. They installed a regulator for the purpose of regulating the pressure
of the gas, which regulator should have been placed outside of
the building, and a pipe should have been connected from the

'66 S. E. Rep. 257 (Dec. i, igo9).
'Extnguisher Co. v. R. R., 137 N. C. 278; Bowers v. R. R., 144 N.

C.684.

'App. Cas. III (igog), 640.
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brass safety valve attached to the regulator to the outside of
the building, to permit the gas which might proceed from the
safety valve to escape to the outside atmosphere instead of remaining inside the building. Gas escaped through the safety
valve, and the plaintiff, an employe of the Railroad Company,
went into the shop to turn it off, when the explosion occurred.
The jury found that the Gas Company had been negligent in
not running a pipe from the safety valve up through the roof
of the building, and as the direct cause of the explosion could
not be attributed to any independent intervening agency, it
was held that the original negligence of the Gas Company was
the proximate cause of the injury. It appeared that the Railroad Company's employes had meddled with the apparatus, and
had hammered the safety valve, which the jury found was negligence; but the real cause of the escape of the gas from the
safety valve was left in doubt. The Gas Company was held
liable.
"The duty being to take precautions, it is no excuse to say
that the accident would not have happened unless some other
agency than that of the defendant had intermeddled with the
matter. A loaded gun will not go off unless some one pulls
the trigger, a poison is inocuous unless some one takes it, gas
may not explode unless it is mixed with air, and then a light
is set to it. . . . On the other hand, if the proximate cause
of the accident is not the negligence of the defendant, but the
conscious act of another volition, then he will not be liable. For
against such conscious act of volition no precaution can really
avail."
G.H.B.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PARTNERSHIP AND A JOINT
ADVENTURE.

It is difficult to determine the exact character of a joint adventure in this country, and to ascertain the distinction, if any,
between it and a partnership. The recent case of Jackson v.
Hooper1 recognizes a clear distinction between the two, but
helps very little to clear up the confusion. In this case the complainant and the defendant were engaged in the subscriptionbook business. They had obtained the copyright and trademark of the Encyclopedia Brittanica, and had formed several
corporations for the purpose of selling the book. After thus en174 Atd. 130 (N. J1.)
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gaging in business for several years, the complainant brought a
bill against the defendant for an account on the theory that they
were partners. The court held that though the business was
actually carried on by the two (the corporations being used
merely as agents), yet there was no partnership, because on examination of the evidence, it appeared that there was no mutual
agency between them. But the business was considered to be a
joint adventure, and the bill for an account was allowed, the
court being of opinion that the same rules of law applied to joint
adventures as to partnership.
Joint adventures originated in Scotland. A joint adventure
under the old Scottish law was regarded as a limited partnership, which might take place with unknown or dormant partners, or with partners who were known, but who used no firm
or social name. It was limited to a single undertaking and differed from a partnership proper in that there was no firm, and
the liability of one party for the engagements of2 another was
fixed by the actual agreement between the parties.
In England at the common law there seems to have been no
true joint adventure, the Scottish joint adventure being regarded as within the principles of a partnership proper. The
term "joint adventure" is applied to a contract where two
jointly agree to buy goods with the intention of dividing the
goods thus purchased ;3 but this is not analogous to the Scottish
joint adventure, because there is no limited partnership at all
in such a case. The goods purchased are merely to be divided;
there is no purpose of reselling and dividing the profits.
In Germany at the present time there is an association analogous to the Scottish joint adventure, known as the non-mercantile partnership,---"an association of persons combining funds
for a single joint transaction." 4 Some of the characteristics of
the non-mercantile partnership are: (i) There is no right to
have a firm name; (2) the property contributed by the partners
does not belong to the partnership as such, but is vested in the
partners as co-owners; (3)there is no implied authority in one
member to act on behalf of the partnership.
In this country, like England, there seems no exact equivalent of the Scottish joint adventure. The cases are not very
clear, and give practically no discussion on the question, but
those which recognize the existence of such a relation seem to
hold that the only difference between it and a partnership is
'Bell's Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Book 7, Chap. 3.
'Hoare v. Dawes, i Douglas 371; Cooper v. Eyre, i H. BI. 37.
' E. J.Schuster, Principles of German Civil Law, page 5.
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that a joint adventure is limited to a single undertaking; 5 although it may comprehend a business to be continued for a
number of years.6 On the other hand, many jurisdictions apparently do not recognize any distinction, but hold that a partnership may exist as to a single undertaking.7 The only practical result of the distinction is that, since a joint adventure relates only to one undertaking, the accounts are simplified in
many cases, and one party may sue the other at law for a
breach of the contract or a share of the profits ;" but this right
will not preclude a suit in equity for an account,9 as was held
in our principal case.
Otherwise the law seems to be the same as in the case of
partnership. In nearly all of the cases cited a firm name was
used, which distinguishes the relation from the old Scottish joint
adventure. Contracts made by one in pursuance of the venture are binding upon all jointly, 10 even though the agreement
between the parties limited the liability of some of them to the
capital contributed." But in Cooper v. Frierson,2 it was held,
that one dealing with a party to a joint adventure was bound
to acquaint himself with the terms of the agreement.
The principal case differs from the majority of the cases in
this country in holding that there is no agency between the parties to a joint adventure. This would seem to be in accord with
the old Scottish joint adventure, but the latter was a ,limited
partnership in which there was no firm name, while in the
principal case the parties used a firm name,-the name of the
corporation; so that the cases are not analogous. The test used
by the court,-that the presence or absence of mutual agency
determines the relationship,-(partnership or joint adventure)
-is unsound, because agency results from partnership, and
'Knapp v. Hanley, loS Mo. App. 353; Wright v. Cumpsty, 41 Pa. 1O2;
Finlay v. Stewart, 56 Pa. 183. See also Hambleton v. Rhind, 84 Md. 456.
SO'Hara v. Harman, 14 N. Y. App. Div. 167; Bradley v. Wolf, 83 N.
Y. Supp. 13.
' T ones v. Davies, 6o Kan. 309; Spencer v. .ones, 92 Tex. 5x6; Two
Hundred and Sixty Hogsheads of Molasses, 24 Fed. Cases 14,296; In re
Warren, 29 Fed. Cas. 17,191; Flower v. Barnekoff, 20 Ore. 132.
'Hurley v. Walton, 63 Ill.
260; Wright v. Cumpsty, 41 Pa. 702; Finlay v. Stewart, 56 Pa. 183; Felbel v. Kahn, 29 N. Y. App. Div. 270.
'Marston v. Gould, 69 N. Y. 220; O'Hara v. Harman, 14 N. Y. App.
Div. 167.
"Slater v. Clark, 68 II. App. 433; Derickson v. Whitney, 72 Mass.
248; Mission Ridge Land Co. v. Nixon, 48 S. W. 405.
Benners v. Harrison,ig Barb. (N. Y.) 53. See also Smith v Burton,
59 Vt. 408.
1248 Miss. "3oo.

NOTES

not partnership from agency. Mutual agency is not a test of
partnership, because the existence of such a relation is the very
question in issue. For this reason the case is of little assistance
in determining the exact character of a joint adventure. The
question is not of great practical importance under the view apparently taken by the majority of the cases, because the only
material distinction, as before-mentioned, is that an action at
law by one party against the other will be allowed.
In closing, mention should be made of a peculiar kind of
partnership in existence in this country, which, while not exactly analogous to the Scottish joint adventure, may be said
to be in a class just below it. This is the mining partnership,where two or more co-operate in working a mine. In such
partnership, one partner cannot by contract bind the others
except for supplies necessary for running the mine, and the
burden is upon the party seeking to hold the firm to show that
such partner had the actual authority to bind the firm.13 It
differs further from an ordinary partnership in that one may
convey his share without dissolving the partnership, 14 and the
death of one partner does not dissolve the firm.
R.S.H.
PAROL

EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE TO CONTRADICT IMPLICATIONS
OF LAW FROM WRITTEN CONTRACT.

Defendant company had been purchasing certain boxes,
cases, and bags from the plaintiff company for defendant's use
in its business during the year 1905 under a written agreement
dated July 25, 1905. While the contract was in force, to wit,
September I, 1905, plpaintiff addressed the following letter to

the defendant:
"Gentlemen: We hereby agree to give you an option from
one year from July 25, 19o6, to furnish boxes at the same
price as agreed upon in contract entered into between the
Mutual Biscuit Co. and Standard Box Company. We furthermore agree to allow discount of 19 2 %o off said prices, as present in said contract."
On July 25, 19o6, the Mutual Biscuit Co. wrote the Standard
Box Co.: "Gentlemen: In accordance with your contract letter
of Sept. I, 1905, we hereby accept the option therein, agreeing

to purchase all of our boxes of you upon the same terms and
prices as in previous contract, 19y7o discount off. **

"Kahn v. Smelting Co., io2 U. S. 64r.
" Skillman v. Lockffcn, 23 Cal. 203.

*'
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By the earthquake and fire of April 18, 19o6, the plant of
defendant was destroyed and was not rebuilt until the latter
part of August of that year. Plaintiff refused to furnish said
boxes at the prices specified in the option and defendant was
obliged to purchase his supply from plaintiff and others at the
market rates, which were higher than the prices quoted in the
option.
In an action for their price as goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered to defendant by plaintiff the court held
that the option, not specifying any time for acceptance, must
be accepted within a reasonable time; that this was not done;
and that plaintiff had right to make its own prices, defendant
having no contract right to demand the boxes at the price
quoted in the option. Defendant offered evidence that it had
been verbally told at the time of the option being made that
it would be allowed one year within which to inform plaintiff
of its acceptance. The lower court ruled out the offer of evidence and the Supreme Court affirmed an order denying a new
trial.
The Court said,' "The rule that prior or contemporaneous negotiations cannot be used to contradict, add to, or vary a written
contract applies not only to the letter of the written document,
but also to its legal effect, as for example, where no time of
performance is fixed, the law implies that a reasonable time is
given, and evidence
that a specific time had been agreed upon is
2'
inadmissable.

It is not apparent what consideration, if any, was given for
the alleged option. But as there was no attempt on the part of
the plaintiff to deny that it was binding on him for its life, i.e.,
a reasonable time from the day on which it was given, this
question does not arise and the sole question to be considered
is, "Is the implication which the law attaches to a written option, which does not specify its duration, that it shall be taken to
remain open for acceptance for a reasonable time after being
given, so much a part of the written instrument that evidence
cannot be given of a parol agreement at the time that it should
be for one year?
The Court said :3

"Appellant cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions
holding that evidence of a subsequent parol agreement may be
given extending the time of performance, but obviously they
'At p. 940.

'Standard Box Co. v. Mutual Biscuit Co., IO3 Pac. 938 (I909).
I At p. 941.
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have no application here for the Civil Code (Section 1698)
provides that 'a contract in writing may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed oral agreement, and not
otherwise.' The claim that the alleged real agreement was an
executed agreement within the meaning of Section 1698, Civ.
Code, is without merit."
Section 1657, Civil Code of California, provides: "If no time
is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed a reasonable time is allowed.

*

*

*"

It will be seen that the Court considered that the provisions
of the Civil Code cited above distinguish the cases from those
in some other states which arrive at a contrary conclusion. Attention is, however, called to the dissenting opinion of Dunbar,
J., in Bryan v. Duff,4 in which it is said:
"Of course, there is no disputing the general rule that parol
evidence cannot be introduced to alter or explain written agreements; but it does not seem to me that the reasons which forbid
the admission of parol evidence to alter or vary the terms of a
written agreement apply to contracts where the obligation is
implied. If a man makes an agreement and reduces the terms
of the agreement to writing and solemnly signs it, for reasons
which have often been stated, he ought to be held to a strict
compliance with its terms; he knows just what he has agreed
to do, and just what his obligations are, for they are of his
own making. But it is altogether different when he is held to
do something by a refined implication of law of which the ordinary citizen has no knowledge."
But for the contrary view see Lord, C. J., in Smith v. Caro
and Baum.5 There the Court said: "When the legal import of
a contract is clear and definite, the intention of the parties is,
for all substantial purposes, as distinctly and as fully expressed,
as if they had written out in words what the law implies. It is
immaterial how much or how little is expressed in words, if the
law attaches to what is expressed as clear and definite import.
Though the writing consists only of a signature, as in the case
of an indorsement in blank, yet where the law attaches to it a
clear, unequivocal and definite import, the contract imparted by
it can no more be varied or contradicted by evidence of a contemporaneous parol agreement, than if the whole contract had
been writteh out in words. The mischief of admitting parol evidence would be the same in such cases, as if the terms implied
'12 Kreider (Wash.) 233, at p. 239.
Bg

Ore. 278 (MI88).
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by law has been expressed," accord, see Martin v. Cole,' where
no mistake or fraud in procuring the indorsement is alleged.

Charles v. Denis;7 contra, Ross v. Espy;s Bank v. Pordyce,9

parol evidence admitted fixing time of payment, the written
agreement being silent on the subject. Stoemer v. Homer.0
Compare, Greenleaf on Evidence, i6th Ed., p. 4o6, par. 277.

LT.P.
I04 U. S. 30 (i88I).
'42 Wis. 56 (z877).

'66 Pa. 481. See p. 483.
'9Pa. 275 (I848).
1145 Pa. 258 (i8qi).

